UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR. NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA. TAHUN PEMBUKAAN. (P r e a m b u l e). Bahwa sesungguhnya Kemerdekaan itu ialah. The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. As amended by the First Amendment of , the Second Amendment of. , the Third Amendment of. UUD in Bahasa Indonesiamaroc-evasion.info laws/uud PREAMBLE. Whereas independence is a genuine right of all.
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The Japanese divided the territory into three military government regions, based on the largest islands: "Sumatra" was under the Japanese 25th Army , "Java" under the Japanese 16th Army and "East Indonesia" the eastern islands , including part of "Borneo" Sarawak and Sabah were under the Japanese 38th Army was under the Imperial Japanese Navy. As the Japanese military position became increasingly untenable, especially after their defeat at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October , more and more native Indonesians were appointed to official positions in the occupation administration.
It was chaired by Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat — The future president Sukarno and vice-president Mohammad Hatta were among its members. It met in the building that had been used by the Dutch colonial quasi-parliament, the Volksraad "People's Council" in central Jakarta.
It held two sessions, 29 May — 1 June and 10—17 July The first session discussed general matters, including the philosophy of the state for future independent Indonesia, Pancasila. The second session produced a provisional constitution made up of 37 articles, 4 transitory provision and 2 additional provision. The nation would be a unitary state and a republic. A print edition of the constitution On 26 July , the Allies called for the unconditional surrender of Japan in the Potsdam Declaration.
The Japanese authorities, realising they would probably lose the war, began to make firm plans for Indonesian independence, more to spite the Dutch than anything else.
The dropping of a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August prompted the Japanese to surrender unconditionally on 15 August The Committee made some fundamental changes, including the removal of 7 words from the text of Jakarta Charter which stated the obligation for Muslims to follow Sharia.
The new charter then became the preambule of the constitution, and the clause stating that the president must be a Muslim was removed. The historical compromise was made possible in part by the influence of Mohamad Hatta and Tengku Mohamad Hasan. The Committee then officially adopted the Constitution.
This was in turn replaced by the Provisional Constitution on 17 August However, this became bogged down in disputes between nationalists and Islamists, primarily over the role of Islam in Indonesia.
Sukarno became increasingly disillusioned by this stagnation and with the support of the military, who saw a much greater constitutional role for themselves, began to push for a return to the Constitution. On this basis, the author is interested to discuss the rearrangement of legislation related to the presidential veto in governmental construction in Indonesia based on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
Formulation of the problem Based on the basic ideas above, this paper tries to elaborate on several questions as follows: 1. How does the President's Veto influence in government through the principles of checks and balances? Veto The first amendment process until the fourth of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia has given birth to a new norm and a new mechanism in the formation of laws. If examined in the academic jurisdiction, the final formulation in Article 5 and Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, after the amendment, whether consciously or unambiguously the formulation of the articles consisting of 5 five versus "materially and juridically" gives " veto "to the president.
Simply put, "Veto" comes from the Latin word which means I forbid or I refuse. While the veto is the right to annul the decisions, decrees, draft regulations and draft laws or resolutions www.
The veto is the right to expressly refuse or disagree with any material of the Draft Law. The existence of a veto becomes a powerful weapon possessed by the president when it does not agree to a Draft Law proposed by the House of Representatives.
Furthermore, Patrialis Akbar mentioned that there is no veto right in the Indonesian state administration system, but that there is only the President's Constitutional Right. Presidential Government System The direct legitimacy of the people sometimes raises the sectoral ego of the legislature against the executive because Indonesia does not adhere to the theory of trial politics purely in the constitution and the unenforceability of the government system used.
As said by Jimly Asshiddiqie: "The Indonesian system of government is intended as a presidential system. Both in explanation and in the general sense. However, there is overlapping germination and provision among the idealized Presidency system with elements of the parliamentary system.
According to Jimly Asshiddiqie in his book mentions that the presidential government system has nine characters as follows: 1 There is a clear separation of powers between the branches of executive and legislative power; 2 The President is a sole executive. The executive power of the president is not divided and there is only the president and vice president. Therefore the executive government is accountable to the constitution; 8 The executive is directly responsible to the sovereign; 9 The power is spread centrally as in a parliamentary system centered on parliament.
Jimly Asshiddiqie, Logically, the application of presidential government system in Indonesia as far as possible can actualize the nine character of presidential government system above. The reality that occurs, based on the character traits of the first there is no clear separation of powers between the branches of executive and legislative power. Article 20 Paragraph 1 states that "the People's Legislative Assembly has the power to form Law" while in Article 5 paragraph 1 it also states "The President has the right to submit a bill to the House of Representatives.
This means that the president and the people's legislative council have the right to veto reject the bill. Furthermore, in article 20 paragraph 4 the president passes a bill that has been mutually agreed to become law. The meaning of this article gives space to the president not to pass the bill into law. What if this condition occurs? The "Veto Presidential Rights" is no longer valid because in Article 20 Paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states that in the case of a jointly-approved bill not approved by the president within 30 days of the approval of the bill, laws and must be enacted.
That is, without any approval from the President any draft law will remain a law after the time limit which has been determined 30 days. Has the President's Veto Rights been used in Indonesia? To note that the presidential veto has been used in the state administration system in Indonesia.
Evidently, there are some laws that are clearly fixed in the legislature even without the president's approval and the law is still valid in Indonesia, such as: 1. Law no. The draft law on the regional head election Law No. Although the president refuses to sign and endorse it, the legislation product will remain in effect. President Megawati Soekarnoputri was not pleased with the formulation of a number of articles in the draft law on parliamentary initiatives.
Consequently, the law minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra and several ministers have withdrawn from discussions with parliament 7. The presidential veto has been used in the days of President Sukarno and Suharto and it is effective. For example, the 5 July presidential decrees, broadcasting laws, hazard laws, the two Laws were rejected by the president and proven to be unenforceable.
The above case exemplifies the impasse of interrupted communication between the executive and the legislature in the formation of the law, consequently, the President's veto is like a toothless tiger, has no force or any implication whatsoever. Therefore, in order to avoid such cases, the constitutional right veto of the president's rejection should be placed as appropriate.
Study Analysis by law and legislation. Judging from the science of legislation, in fact, we can not only see from Article 20 paragraph 5 because in fact there is something that is not related between Article 5 paragraph 1 and Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
Prior to the amendment, Article 5 said the President had the power to form an Act with the approval of the People's Legislative Assembly. But now article 5 paragraph 1 President "entitled" to submit a draft law.
So the President is not mandatory, just entitled.
This means that if the president does not want a law, the president does not file a bill. In the first and second amendments, the authority was delegated to parliament.
But in the next paragraph, Article 20 paragraph 2 every draft law is discussed by parliament and president for mutual consent.
Logically, if the proposed law is the House of Representatives, why should it be approved by the president?
Except, on the contrary, the draft law is filed by the president executive , it must be discussed and agreed jointly by the parliament and the President. Then, it becomes inconsistent again after Article 20 Paragraph 4 The President passes a bill that has been agreed together to become a law. So, here then we become confused and vague interpret the substance, which became the legislative body of the President or the people's representative council? Furthermore, if we relate to Article 20 Paragraph 5 , then it appears to be in conformity with Article 20 Paragraph 4 in which the President must pass a bill, then the President shall not be authorized to legalize it.
Since Article 20 Paragraph 5 explains that "in the case of mutually agreed mutual law, it is not authorized by the President within 30 days since the draft law is approved, the law shall be lawful and shall be invited. The legal language should not provide multiple interpretations, as it will lead to different understandings and actions. Moreover, this article is written in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as the constitutional basis of the state.
As the word mandatory in paragraph 5 , means that if there are no sanctions.
But, what sanctions? If there are additional subsequent verses that affirm sanctions, it is permissible. That is, the phrase "the draft law is lawful and must be enacted". The sentence should be "and enacted", the word must be omitted which means it must be enacted and must be done by the president, not as a liability which means there are sanctions in it. In legal language, "Promulgation" is placing a law that has been approved by the President in a state sheet.
Jimly Asshiddiqie said that "the enactment of a law that is not signed by the president is a law enacted by an unofficial authority onbevoegheid ". Then, if we examine Article 85 of Law Number 12 the Year on the formation of legislation that is obliged to enact is the Minister of Law and Human Rights.
If so, what is the position of the minister against the president? The President has clearly rejected vetoed to enact, his courageous time to enact. If so that can govern the Minister of Law and Human Rights there are two names, the president, and the law. So, if the verse behind actually disregards the previous verse. But it must be remembered that within the organization and management there is also the law. Legal Grammar organization and management law say, "Authority can be delegated, but responsibility cannot be delegated.
For information, in the legislative system adopted in Indonesia after the amendment of the Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, the president's opportunity to reject the draft law can only be made at the stage of discussion and mutual agreement at the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives. So if the president uses his veto power at the time of the mutual agreement between the government minister assigned by the president and parliament it can be said to be too late because the presidential veto becomes worthless see Article 20 paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
Furthermore, in this article when the president does not authorize the draft of the law into law, it is certain that the president will still not violate Indonesian law or constitution. The implication is that the president cannot implement the law so that the consequences of substance and the meaning of the law have no meaning because it is imposed and may even lead to institutional and even personal conflicts of interest in the legislative and executive bodies.
The situation raises the question; to what extent is the effectiveness of the veto or constitutional rights of the president according to the Indonesian legislation?
However, the prescient veto right in Indonesia is currently proven ineffective because the president's rejection of the Draft Law remains the Law, although there will be or no material review through judicial review by the Constitutional Court. This situation seems to be confirmed by the president by imposing his will and parliament also impose his will.
Indonesia as a constitutional state, it is clear that the articles of the Constitution of the Constitution regarding the "veto" constitutional rights of the president and parliament need to be revised for improvement so as not to cause errors in legal interpretation and implementation in the hope that the principle of balance of authority and mutual supervision among state institutions can be effectively implemented.
The authority of the Presidential legislation regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is contained in Article 22 Paragraph 1 "In the case of a compelling inclination, the President shall be entitled to enact a law enforcement regulation".