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Cherry blossoms are in bloom — the most beautiful time of the year in Japan Bhutan students are formally admitted in Kyutech Trip report to Ghana 5. Trip report to Nigeria 6.
Tokyo unveils its logo for international branding 7. Altitude of the ISS for the past year 3. How does the ISS orbit the earth?
The SpaceX Florida launch that did not happen 6. Trip Report to Mongolia 7. Some of the messages received regarding the successful launch The launch is covered by Nigerian television What is Tana Bata Day? Amelia Greig teaches rocket propulsion course Some photos from Bhutan Team Bangladesh trip to home Upcoming space technology events — message from the United Nations Yeshey gives a public talk on "Bhutan in Space" at Kyutech Library 2. Japan changes landing permission sticker Naadam Celebration by Kyutech Mongolians Report by Ms.
Gladys Yaa Saah Oppong on her recent visit to Kyutech Report on the ground station in the Philippines The departure of the UiTM delegation 5. Check out this popular beer joint the next time you visit Kitakyushu 7. A new age for remote sensing -- using nimble satellites Two space videos worth seeing both at YouTube Apiwat met UN space expert in Bangkok on 16th Sept Friday, 13 Oct. Hawks baseball team takes the championship in Japan 6. The kind of pics possible with passive attitude control from Horyu-4 8.
Call for papers — first conference convened by new Center for Satellite Communication Introducing Dr. Noraisyah of UiTM, Malaysia How to adapt to a fast-changing world 4. Assembling FM flight models is serious business 5. Ghanian Times of 21 Nov 7.
BIRDS-3 logo contest International Workshop on Lean Satellite — Mwangi Mbuthia Univ. What is Hinamatsuri? Mid-winter snow falls on northern Kyushu A simple farewell dinner for Dr Huzaimy of Malaysia BIRDS-2 camera quality tests BIRDS-2 satellite passes over ground stations Beginning in , U. The development of new ELVs followed quickly. The three-stage Delta II entered operational service in and could place 3,—4, pounds into orbit depending on configuration.
The Titan IV, the only current operational version, is the largest and most powerful U. ELV in use. The mighty Saturn V Moon rocket, the most powerful launch system ever developed, had a thrust at launch of 7. And those are just basic launch costs to orbit; they do not include the cost of satellite development, indemnification, boost to optimum orbit, ground support and transportation, operations, and the like. The result is that spaceflight remains an enormously costly business.
No wonder that it has been the province of the government, a few high-end commu- nications satellite companies, and other unique users, despite attempts to encour- 41 age further development of launch technology. From the beginning, responsibilities for ELV acquisition, development, and operations, in addition to the operation, maintenance, improvement, and modernization of the launch bases and ranges, resided in the acquisition and development arm of Air Force Systems Command AFSC.
Between and , commercial launch ac- tivities climbed back to their pre-Challenger level of around 20 percent of U. For the next few years, U. As the backlog of commercial payloads that had been delayed by the launch failures was flown out, an average of more than 12 launches per year were conducted from to see Figure 5.
Recognizing the critical importance of space transportation to the U. Both agencies were directed to involve the U. In several versions, Atlas and Delta were to continue to be major U. Beginning in the U.
It had no commercial appeal, because of its price tag per flight, and its principal user, the DoD, was finding fewer payloads for it with every year. The Titan launcher will be extinct before Since USA increased performance by almost one third, cut ground processing time nearly in half, and reduced operating costs by more than one third when adjusted for inflation. For example, over the past six years, no fewer than nine start-up com- panies have emerged with the objective of building their own launch vehicle with little or no government involvement.
Following the end of the Cold War, U. A debate has raged between those who believe RLVs are the only—or at least the best— answer and those who emphasize the continuing place of ELVs in future space access operations.
Such a concept was quite simple in theory, although enormously complex in reality. It required developing a passenger spaceplane with the capability to fly from an ordinary runway like a conventional jet. Flying supersonic it would reach an alti- tude of about 45, feet when the pilot would start scramjet engines, a more efficient, faster jet engine that has the potential to reach hypersonic speeds in the Mach 3 realm.
These take the vehicle to the edge of space for a flight to the op- posite side of the globe, from whence the process is reversed and the vehicle lands like a conventional airplane. It never would reach orbit, but it would still fly in space, and the result is the same as orbital flight for passengers but for less time.
It would even be possible, RLV supporters insisted, to build such a space- plane that could reach orbit. It finally died a merciful death, trapped as it was in bureaucratic politics and seemingly endless technological difficulty, in This is the first of a projected set of four stages that would lead to a routine space faring capability.
The X project, undertaken in partnership with Lockheed Martin, had an ambitious timetable to fly by But what would happen after its tests were completed remained unclear. Even assuming complete success in meeting its research-and-development objectives, the time and money necessary to build, test, and certify a full-scale operational follow-on version has remained problematic.
Who would pay for such an operational vehicle also re- mained a mystery, especially since the private sector has become less enamored with the joint project during the years and has eased itself away from the ven- ture.
Any SSTO, and X holds true to this pattern, would require breakthroughs in a number of technologies, particularly in propul- sion and materials. And when designers begin work on the full-scale SSTO, they may find that available technologies limit payload size so severely that the new vehicle provides little or no cost savings compared to old launchers. If this be- comes the case, then everyone must understand that NASA will receive the same barbs from critics as had been seen with the Shuttle.
But while the goal may be the development of a launch system that is significantly cheaper, more reliable, and more flexible than presently available it is possible to envision a future system that cannot meet those objec- tives. This is all the more true in a situation where breakthrough, revolutionary technologies do not emerge. While reusable rockets may seem to be as an attractive cost-saving alternative to expendables because they allow repeated use of critical components, such as rocket motors and structural elements, ELV advocates claim they offer a false promise of savings.
This is be- cause all RLV savings are predicated on maximizing usage of a small number of vehicles during a long period of time for all types of space launch requirements.
Accordingly, cost savings are realized only when an RLV flies many times dur- ing many years. That goal is unattainable, they claim, because it assumes that there will be no or few accidents in the reusable fleet throughout its life span.
Indeed, the launch reliability rate of even relatively simple ELVs—those without upper stages or spacecraft propul- sion modules and with significant operational experience—peaks at 98 percent with the Delta II and that took 30 years of operations to achieve.
To be sure, most ELVs achieve a reliability rate of 90—92 percent, again only after a matur- ing of the system has taken place. The Space Shuttle, a partially reusable system, has attained a launch reliability rate of slightly more than 98 percent, but only through extensive and costly redundant systems and safety checks. In the case of a new RLV, or a new ELV for that matter, a higher failure rate has to be as- sumed because of a lack of experience with the system. Moreover, RLV use doubles the time of exposure of the vehicle to failure because it must also be re- covered and be reusable after refurbishment.
To counter this challenge, more and better reliability has to be built into the system and this exponentially increases both research and development and operational costs. One use of a rocket motor, guidance system, and the like, means that it only needs to function correctly one time.
Acceptance of an operational reliability of 90 percent or even less would further reduce the costs incurred in designing and developing a new ELV. Indeed, many experts believe that reliability rates cannot be advanced more than 1.
For expensive and one-of-a-kind scientific and military satellites, and expensive commercial spacecraft, spacecraft with a reliability rate and a higher price tag could be acceptable. But for most payloads, especially logistics supplies and the like, going to the International Space Station, reliabilities as low as 80 percent might be acceptable.
The debate continues and will not end until a truly outstanding launch vehicle emerges that achieves what has been proposed and thereby quells critics. Conclusion Since the beginning of spaceflight more than 50 years ago, those who seek to travel in space have been, in essence, between a rocket and a hard place. It allowed the still exceptionally limited exploitation of space technology for all manner of activi- ties important on Earth—communications, weather, global positioning, and a host of other remote sensing satellites—to such an extent that many individuals in the United States today cannot conceive of a world in which these technolo- gies did not exist.
This same chemical rocket technology made possible human flight into space, albeit for an exceptionally limited number of exceptional peo- ple, and the visiting of robotic probes from this planet to neighbors in the solar system.
These have been enormously significant, and overwhelmingly positive, developments. They have also been enormously expensive, despite sustained efforts to reduce the cost of spaceflight.
One is to use rocket propulsion and, with new materials and clever engineering, to make a launcher that is not only recoverable, but also robust. The other is to use air-breathing launchers, and thus to employ the potentially large mass fractions that air breathing engines theoreti- cally promises to build a robust launcher.
Then there are other options still. Most launch vehicle efforts throughout the history of the space age, unfortunately, have committed a fair measure of self-deception and wishful thinking.
A large ambitious program is created, hyped, and then fails as a result of unrealistic ex- pectations, especially with regard to technical risk. These typically have blurred the line, which should be bright, between revolutionary, high-risk, high-payoff research-and-development efforts and low-risk, marginal payoff evolutionary efforts to improve operational systems.
Efforts to break the bonds of this dece p- tion may well lead in remarkable new directions in future launcher development efforts. See Roger D. Launius and Howard E.
Evans and Co. Isakowitz, Joseph P. Hopkins, Jr. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W.
Smith, eds. Emme, ed. Swenson, James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. The "New SAT" has been changed once again since this book was published. Still, it's worth reading if you can find a copy. I spent a summer as a full-time professional SAT tutor. I read my company's guidebook. I read guidebooks from Princeton Review and Kaplan and Sparknotes and a few other authors.
Rocket Review was the best book by a significant margin. It's been carefully laid out so that it will be equally useful to students who are equally strong in each area and students who have one partic The "New SAT" has been changed once again since this book was published.
It's been carefully laid out so that it will be equally useful to students who are equally strong in each area and students who have one particular weakness. Information is presented in a linear, almost narrative format as opposed to in most test-prep books, where random facts are thrown at the reader to be memorized. However, I did integrate a few of the author's ideas into my own teaching, with apparent success. Again, I highly recommend finding a copy.
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