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MyAIM merupakan usaha Jakim untuk menyediakan maklumat dan panduan tentang Islam dalam pelbagai media; media audio/video dan media cetak melalui. Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian 1 Islam and the BKPRMI Badan Kontak Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia (Contact Organ of . Toko buku online, pasar ebook dan buku digital. Tempat Anda bisa menghasilkan passive income dengan menjual ebook, PDF, PPT dan produk digital lainnya.
Will Robert survive when our beloved jihadis try to brutally murder him? Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam Middle East Forum That there is no compulsion in Islam and that Islam is a religion of peace are common refrains among Muslim activists,  academics,  officials, :. Dilengkapi artikel keislaman, konsultasi agama, kristologi, counter liberalisme, intelligent leaks, ruang khusus Muslimah dan Remaja Islam Wikipedia bahasa Indonesia, ensiklopedia bebas Islam memberikan banyak amalan keagamaan.
Para penganut umumnya digalakkan untuk memegang Lima Rukun Islam, yaitu lima pilar yang menyatukan Muslim sebagai sebuah komunitas.
Berita Dunia Islam, Mengabarkan Kebenaran hidayatullah. Assalamu alaykum wa rahamatullahi wa barakatuhu: 1. The history of the quest for the historical Muhammad in the modern Western literature has its origins from the time c. The KPPSI was vocal in its demand of the enforcement of Shariah in the province but not very explicit about what this should mean nor very successful in achieving even symbolic successes. Politicians, up to the provincial governor, paid some lip service to the idea of enacting regional Shariah legislation but since a broad range of public personalities with solid Islamic credentials opposed it, the issue was shelved — except in the district of Bulukumba, in the southernmost part of the province.
Significantly, this bupati was a Golkar politician and had no connections with the KPPSI but believed the regulations would be popular with his constituency.
The KPPSI has an ambivalent attitude towards democracy — it does not think highly of a system in which a majority vote carries more weight than the divine command — but its members do take part in elections, and several were elected into the provincial parliament. His poor showing in the contest just over 20 per cent of the vote indicated that the people of the province have other priorities than the formalization of the Shariah. Yet there has not even been an attempt to have local Shariah regulations enacted here.
This paradox is easily explained: The city has sizable Chinese and Arab communities, both involved in trade and still strongly concentrated in distinct neighbourhoods, Jebres and Pasar Kliwon, respectively.
Two other neighbourhoods are known as concentrations of Javanese pious Muslims, the Kauman next to the court mosque, where court and mosque officials live, and Laweyan, home to Javanese small entrepreneurs, mostly 01 CDII.
The other neighbourhoods are predominantly abangan. Contrary to the widely held view that opposes the syncretistic culture of the Javanese courts to scriptural Islam, the first institutions of Islamic education in Solo were established at the initiative of the court. Surprisingly, neither the Muhammadiyah nor the NU had much influence here until much later, and these associations that dominate Islamic education elsewhere in Java have remained rather weak in Solo.
It was only during the New Order period that it received serious competitors. The DDII was established by former Masyumi politicians who were no longer allowed to participate actively in politics and who saw dakwah, Islamic propagation, as the most needed and appropriate method of changing social norms and social behaviour.
Strongly supported by the national leadership, the Central Javanese branch based in Solo established an Islamic radio station, an Islamic hospital, and a pesantren dedicated to training committed preachers for carrying out the dakwah mission. The pesantren, Al-Mukmin, later became widely known by the name of the village where it moved after a few years, Ngruki. Increasingly influenced by the ideas and strategies of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, he joined the underground Darul Islam networks when this was being revived and used the pesantren for recruiting committed cadres of an Islamic movement.
The recruits were trained in small groups usrah that constituted cells of a clandestine movement. Much of the usrah network remained in place, however, and several 01 CDII. In a major clash between the two factions in , some of the radical teachers were expelled from Ngruki and established a new pesantren or joined an existing one in the Solo region. Possibly the conflict in Ngruki was also related to another rupture that emerged around the same time.
In Malaysia Sungkar had come increasingly under the influence of global Salafi jihadism. After a clash with Masduki, the leader of the branch of the Darul Islam NII to which he adhered, broke away and set himself up as the amir commander of his own network, henceforth known as Jamaah Islamiyah. Both appear to have been present in Ngruki, but NII predominated. For understandable reasons, Ngruki has received a lot of attention, but it is not the most influential dakwah initiative of the early New Order.
Adapting its style to local culture and specifically addressing abangan audiences while spreading a message critical of that culture and worldview, this movement reaches a much wider public than any other. Its constituency is mostly the social and geographical periphery of Solo; no Arabs are active in it, and only a small number of university educated people. In the first years after the demise of the New Order, Solo witnessed the emergence of a large number of Islamic vigilante groups, similar to those in the Jakarta region but larger in number and even more active.
Most of these groups were ephemeral, emerging and dissolving in response to specific events in Indonesia or the world outside the civil war in the Moluccas, the American attack of Iraq. Besides the occasional anti- 01 CDII. One is tempted to say that they did not waste energy on demanding local Shariah regulations but directly imposed their own version of Shariah rule instead.
This is a rather closed community or sect, whose members distinguish themselves by dress style similar to that of the Salafis but who have no relation to the broader Salafi movement. There has been a general shift in religious orientation towards Salafism, the extremely puritan brand of Islam that is the official doctrine in Saudi Arabia, which appears to have affected almost all radical movements and organizations in Solo.
There seems to be a paradox in the fact that the Salafi movement is making its advances especially in parts of the country where syncretistic varieties of Islam, the opposite extreme to Salafism, are predominant, such as Solo.
Salafism appears to be attractive precisely to people of abangan background because it is simple and rigid, and has clear rules; its transnational character gives it the additional attraction of cosmopolitanism.
More generally, one may conclude that radical movements were relatively successful in Solo because the large national mainstream Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU were only marginally present there. In spite of their relative successes, however, the radical movements remained minorities among a majority that still holds strongly to abangan views and values.
The founders of the Liberal Islam Network JIL adopted this name from an influential anthology of texts by modern Muslim thinkers that represented a broad range of intellectual positions Kurzman They have also defended political and economic liberalism, which some of them see as inseparable from religious liberalism. Conservatives notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges to established authority, as well as to modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture.
There are conservatives among traditionalist as well as reformist Muslims i. They obviously share some views with most conservatives, such as the rejection of hermeneutics and of rights-based discourses, but may clash with conservatives over established practices lacking strong scriptural foundations.
On the role in these massacres of a major Muslim youth organization, affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama, see Bruinessen The fatwa clearly targeted, however, various groups that adhered to less radical views of liberalism and pluralism and that will be discussed below.
Significantly, the MUI made no statement condemning the violence against Ahmadiyah members and appeared to consider the Ahmadiyah as the offending party. See Crouch A collection of articles by one of the contributors to that volume, Ebrahim Moosa, were published in Indonesian translation by the Jakarta-based Center for Islam and Pluralism; see Moosa References Barton, Greg. Studia Islamika 4, no. Barton, Gregory James. Monash University, In Indonesien am Ende des Jahrhunderts, edited by Ingrid Wessel.
Abera-Verlag, In Indonesia in Transition: Pustaka Pelajar, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3rd ed. Brill, Inside Indonesia , July—September Working paper. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Bush, Robin. Anomaly or Symptom? Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Cribb, Robert, ed. The Indonesian Killings — Studies from Java and Bali. Crouch, Melissa. Gillespie, Piers. Journal of Islamic Studies 18, no. Hasan, Noorhaidi. Laskar Jihad: Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Klinken, Gerry van.
Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars. Routledge, Kurzman, Charles, ed. Liberal Islam: A Source Book. New York: Oxford University Press, Translated into Indonesian as Wacana Islam Liberal.
Paramadina, Moosa, Ebrahim. Islam Progresif: William Liddle. Journal of Democracy 15, no. Feeling Threatened: Amsterdam University Press, Safi, Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oneworld, The two largest Muslim associations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama NU , which have long dominated Muslim social life and educational activities in Indonesia, are probably the largest and most complex organizations of the entire Muslim world.
Those expressing a strong identification with these associations amounted to 4 and 17 per cent, which would amount to 9 and 38 million followers, respectively Mujani and Liddle Card-carrying, dues-paying membership is no doubt considerably lower, but these two associations have reached a degree of societal penetration that is unparalleled in the Muslim world.
The organizations provide a wide range of services to their constituencies, from education, health care and charity to answering religious questions and determining beginning and end of the fasting month. The Muhammadiyah and NU are the most conspicuous, though by no means the only representatives of these two streams. This includes especially relations with the spirit world, intercession by saints, and various forms of magic.
Most contemporary reformists, however, are wary of too much rationalism and contextualization, and one aspect of the developments discussed in this volume is the shift away from rationalistic modernism to more literal readings of scripture and puritanical reform. They tend to be tolerant of the incorporation of local cultural forms of expression in their religious life.
The scholars of Islam, ulama, are highly respected, and it is considered better to follow great ulama of the past rather than reason independently. The favourite form of education is the pesantren curriculum, in which the study of classical Arabic texts, with a strong emphasis on fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, is central. The fierce competition between the major political parties of those years made this division appear as more pervasive and meaningful than it probably was in daily life: After the highly politicized Sukarno years, the New Order was a period of depoliticization and economic growth.
The major reformist associations The Muhammadiyah was the first reformist or modernist association of Indonesia, established in Yogyakarta in Muhammadiyah schools teach primarily modern subjects; religious instruction takes only a modest place and uses Indonesian textbooks, no Arabic texts.
Within the Muhammadiyah, the regions of Yogyakarta and West Sumatra have long been seen as competing poles, representing different styles of reformism. West Sumatra had a strong reformist tradition even before the emergence of the Muhammadiyah, and the Sumatran Muhammadiyah branches have tended to be more puritan i. After independence, the Muhammadiyah became increasingly an association of Muslim civil servants, and presently the organization is pervaded by a civil servant ethos. The Muhammadiyah is strongly represented in the higher echelons of the Ministry of Education, and in the post-Soeharto period it has successfully attempted control of the Ministry and have its views on education enshrined in legislation.
All three are reformist in religious doctrine in the sense of rejecting beliefs and practices that were not present in original Islam as well in method of education. Besides, there are a number of reformist associations of regional importance, about which more below.
Al Irsyad was to remain an ethnic association of exclusively non-sayyid Arabs, strongly influenced by Egyptian reformism and Arab nationalism. It established Arabic-medium schools, using textbooks from Egypt. The Jamiat Chair henceforth remained firmly in the hands of the sayyid faction. Persis an abbreviation of Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union was established in by a group of reformist-minded Sumatrans living in the West Javanese city of Bandung, with a modest self-educated man of Indian descent, A.
Hassan, as the leading religious thinker.
Bandung has remained the centre of this organization, with its first major educational institution, a modernist pesantren. A secondary centre emerged later in 02 CDII. He established another religious school there and began publishing the influential journal Al-Muslimun, which found an audience well beyond the membership of Persis. Though a small organization, it has been quite influential, because its leading thinkers were highly respected by other reformists.
Its most famous, and most influential, member was Mohamad Natsir, who in the struggle for independence joined the Masyumi party and became its most prominent leader. Established in as an association of indigenous traders to protect common interests against Chinese competition, it very soon turned into a Muslim nationalist association that drew its following from a broad cross-section of the indigenous population.
The PSII had a lasting influence on the social and political agendas of other movements. It lost its dramatic impact in the s but survived into Independence, until it was forced to merge with the other Muslim parties into the PPP in The abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in and the conquest of Mecca by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in the same year were important triggers: There were serious concerns that such purges of traditional Islamic practices as well as the traditional pesantren curriculum might also occur in Indonesia.
The establishment of a formal association was in itself a modern response, which did not at all come naturally to traditional Muslims, because of its association with the non-Muslim colonizing power. It involved drawing up by-laws in accordance with Dutch legislation, which had to be signed in front of a notary public.
The founders of the NU were religious scholars and traders many in fact combined those rules , and the association has from the beginning been closely associated with the traditional religious schools pesantren and the charismatic teachers kiai ruling these institutions.
The NU defines its religious identity by the core elements of the traditional pesantren curriculum: Whereas the latter organization controls its own modern schools, NU has no equivalent authority over the pesantren, which belong to individual kiai. The NU was originally established as an association of kiai, and when it developed into an organization with a mass following, the kiai remained a special elite within the organization.
This is reflected in the structure of the board, in which at all levels the executive named Tanfidziyah is at least nominally subordinate to a religious council named Syuriah , of which only kiai are members. Major policy decisions were taken at congresses, at which the kiai retained a disproportionate influence, even when they were far outnumbered by other members. After Indonesia had gained independence, the NU was transformed into a political party. In the parliamentary elections, it ended up as the third largest party, with A decade later, at its congress, the NU decided to withdraw completely from party politics, to sever its special relationship with the PPP, and not to allow members to hold simultaneously positions in the NU and a political party.
Soon after the fall of the Soeharto regime, it was Abdurrahman Wahid himself who established a political party that he intended to be the political vehicle of the NU and his own ambitions, the PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Party of National Awakening. The formal separation between the NU and political parties has remained, however. The NU is a truly national organization, with active branches in all provinces including even Papua , but it is significantly stronger in some provinces than in others.
Its true heartland is still East Java, and Central Java comes second. It was established by teachers of traditional Islamic schools surau and madrasah, corresponding to the Javanese pesantren. The Minangkabau have migrated all over the Archipelago, and one finds branches of Perti wherever there are significant Minangkabau communities. In matters of religious orthodoxy, Perti is perhaps even more conservative than NU.
At Independence, Perti declared itself a political party it was the first group to leave the umbrella organization Masyumi. For this reason, the organization had some difficulties in the early Soeharto period. When all Muslim parties were ordered to merge into the PPP, one faction of Perti did so; another faction decided to join Golkar instead, in which it remained a distinct component under the name of Tarbiyah Islamiyah.
Three other traditionalist regional associations deserve mention: These associations introduced reforms in the method of education but remained traditionalist in terms of doctrine and ritual.
The traditionalist association Perti also had a distinct following in Aceh, but this appeared to be restricted to regions with a strong Minangkabau influence. On the one hand, traditionalists have come to adopt much of the discourse of earlier generations of reformists; on the other, reformist associations such as the Muhammadiyah have lost some of their modernist and innovating character and become more conservative.
In the s and s, there was arguably more intellectual ferment in the NU, more critical reflection on the tradition, than there was reflection on reform in the Muhammadiyah.
More importantly, there were new intellectual trends that could not be assigned to the reformist or the traditionalist mainstreams but appeared to transcend both. The most significant of these, during the s and s, was the movement for renewal of Islamic thought, of which former student leader Nurcholish Madjid was the main protagonist and to which Abdurrahman Wahid later came to make major contributions.
This movement took inspiration from early twentieth-century modernism but was critical of established Indonesian reformism as well as conservative traditionalist thought, and it showed great appreciation of intellectual dimensions of the Islamic tradition that had been rejected by earlier modernists. This movement will be discussed below, in the section focusing on Muslim intellectuals. University campuses were also the breeding ground for an entirely new type of Islamic movement, organized as semi-clandestine Islamic study groups in the s and s, and emerging in public after the fall of the Soeharto regime as the Indonesian chapters of transnational Islamic movements.
A movement that was slightly different in character, and notably less organized, was the Salafi movement. These three movements have, in different ways, become major challenges for the NU and Muhammadiyah. They have made significant inroads among the constituency of these large associations and have challenged their control over mosques, schools and other institutions.
The Muhammadiyah and NU are national organizations, in the sense of being organized nationwide but also of having been part of the movement for national independence and being dedicated to the idea of Indonesia as a nation. The Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Salafi movement reject the very idea of the nation as a legitimate entity. They follow authorities who are based outside Indonesia. The Tarbiyah movement also owed allegiance to authorities based in the Middle East, and the PKS may now take its strategic decisions itself, but it regularly communicates with other national chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Official Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia The Majelis Ulama Indonesia Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars, MUI was established in by the Soeharto government to serve as an interface between the government and the Muslim community, advising the former on sensitive matters and explaining its policies in terms acceptable to the believers.
Its members were drawn from the various Muslim organizations to represent the entire range of mainstream views, but they were government-appointed and not answerable to their organizations. After the demise of the New Order, the MUI attempted to transform itself from a semi-governmental to a civil society organization, with regular congresses at which leaders are elected and broad policies discussed.
It moreover co-opted representatives of various strands of political Islam, that had been beyond the pale during the Soeharto period. Muslim political parties After a period during which all legal Muslim political representation had been reduced to a single political party that was not even overtly Islamic, the United Development Party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP , the fall of the Soeharto regime enabled the emergence of various new parties that appealed specifically to segments of the Muslim electorate.
To some extent, the situation of the s reminded of the political landscape of the period of liberal democracy in the s, although there were also some entirely new phenomena, most significantly the Islamist party PKS with its highly trained cadres and explicitly Islamist ideology. Masyumi and NU, which polled 21 and The Darul Islam persisted as an underground movement throughout the Soeharto period and resurfaced in various forms in the s. Masyumi The Masyumi party owed its existence to the Japanese occupying forces, which made an effort to bring all Muslim groups and associations together in a single anti-imperialist front of that name.
In the early s, the traditionalist associations Perti and NU broke away from Masyumi to become political parties in their own right. From then on, Masyumi was more strongly associated with reformist Islam, although some traditionalist groups preferred to remain politically affiliated with Masyumi. It was precisely over these issues that the party repeatedly clashed with Sukarno. Both parties were formally dissolved in and could never be officially resuscitated.
Soeharto never trusted the leading Masyumi politicians, however; the party remained banned, and he made sure its leaders played no part in any new political formation.
The most prominent leaders, 02 CDII. Some middle-ranking Masyumi politicians were allowed to continue playing a part in politics under the New Order. Others decided to join the government political machine, Golkar. The PBB appealed to those who remained most loyal to the Masyumi heritage; it performed very poorly in the elections, however, obtaining 1.
Nahdlatul Ulama Originally an association of Islamic scholars and teachers ulama , NU separated from Masyumi in and became a political party. It surprised itself by its success in the elections, and had to recruit competent persons outside its own circles to be able to fill all seats in parliament it had gained. It lost this control in the first New Order government and never regained it during the New Order.
In 02 CDII. Individual members were free to be active in any political party of their choice but could not hold functions in a party as well as the NU organization. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan PPP The United Development Party, PPP, established by heavy-handed intervention of the New Order regime, was nonetheless the closest thing to an established opposition party and the military went to great length to weaken its performance in elections.
PPP had a limited political agenda but fought for what it considered core Muslim interests: After the demise of the New Order, many members left PPP and joined one or the other of the new Islamic parties, but the party has, in spite of internal conflicts, managed to maintain a core of loyal supporters. In it still obtained The PKB explicitly does not wish to be an Islamic party but one that represents the entire nation — but its personnel is almost exclusively of NU background.
The party has been split over rivalries between Abdurrahman Wahid and various former allies, and rapidly declined in popularity, from The PKB is not the only party claiming to represent the NU constituency, although definitely the largest one.
Because Amien was the chairman of Muhammadiyah until he resigned to lead this new party, PAN is often seen as a Muhammadiyah- affiliated party, but in fact it represented from the beginning a rainbow coalition also including non-Muslims, like the informal action committee from which it emerged, the Majelis Amanat Rakyat MARA. The PAN does not have an Islamic programme, though in the course of the years its social base gradually narrowed to a largely Muslim constituency.
The latest addition to the Muslim party landscape is the Sun of the Nation Party Partai Matahari Bangsa , established in by young men with a Muhammadiyah background including former chairmen of Pemuda Muhammadiyah and Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah.
Their aim was to create a political vehicle more representative of Muhammadiyah than PAN. The Muhammadiyah board, however, has refused to recognize any specific connection between this party and the Muhammadiyah, and insists that the Muhammadiyah is non-political and does not endorse any party. Along with the PAN, the PK was the party with the most sophisticated party programme and most transparent structure among those contesting the first post-Soeharto elections.
It won 1. Encouraged by this success, the leadership targeted even more significant growth during the following period, apparently at the expense of its former standards of admission of members and the quality of cadre training. Women are conspicuously active in the party; in the elections, it fielded a larger proportion of women candidates than most other parties.
It appealed especially to those sections of the educated middle class that were ideologically committed to political Islam, but more generally to all those who were disaffected with the corruption and inefficacy rampant in other parties. The party has organized effective social welfare and disaster relief activities, which have won it much goodwill.
The rapid growth has stalled, however. In the elections it obtained 7. The Darul Islam movement emerged in the independence struggle from resistance groups in West Java that rejected concessions made to the Dutch by the Republican government.
The leader and chief ideologist of the Darul Islam, S. Kartosoewirjo, had been an active member of the Sarekat Islam and a leading Masyumi politician in the early years of the Independence struggle, before he proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia. Similar movements in South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar and Aceh led by Daud Beureueh joined the West Java-based movement when they were frustrated with the central government.
This was a political alliance; in terms of religious views the movements were rather different from one another. The rank and file of the West Javanese DI, on the other hand, were largely traditionalist Muslims which in the mids was to be the reason of a split in the underground movements. After that date, it survived as an underground movement, partly controlled and manipulated by intelligence operatives, and occasionally coming into the limelight with a series of terrorist actions. The movement appeared to be divided in a number of rival groups, of different degrees of sophistication.
One of these groups, the regional network of the larger Jakarta region including the entire north coast of West Java , became later known as KW IX or Ninth Regional Command and was accused by other Islamic activists of being involved in robbery and a wide range of other criminal activities as a fund-raising activity.
The alleged leader of this NII wing, Panji Gumilang, established a huge and lavishly furnished pesantren, named Al-Zaytun, that drew much attention for its spectacular architecture and the patronage it appeared to receive from powerful politicians during the late Soeharto years as well as in the post-Soeharto period. They were the founders, among other things, of the reformist pesantren of Ngruki, after which their network was later sometimes named, and they were familiar with contemporary Middle Eastern Islamist thought.
They appear to have joined NII in the s and infused the movement with new ideas and methods of cadre training derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. Around 02 CDII. JI was involved in a series of violent incidents in Indonesia and neighbouring countries; in fact, most of the terrorists of the s have been connected with JI or breakaway sections of it.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that NII has successfully recruited teenagers in various parts of Java, persuading them to leave their families and become full-time activists. Day-to-day affairs were run by a small executive board, based in Yogyakarta.
It has a network stretching across the country and showed in August that it can mobilize at least , people. HTI also rejects liberal democracy and boycotts elections, and it aggressively proselytizes, especially in NU circles. Its ultimate aim is the establishment of a caliphate uniting the entire Muslim world but it has no clear strategy on how to achieve this objective.
As long as there is not a Caliph to lead the jihad against the enemies of Islam, it rejects all political violence. The FPI made a name for itself with vigilante raids on nightclubs, bars and other dens of inequity.
Rizieq Syihab studied religion in Saudi Arabia and has a public discourse influenced by Salafism, but his organization is not taken seriously as a religious movement by most other committed Muslims.
Another movement that aggressively fights what it considers as deviant forms of Islam, and that is taken more seriously though not necessarily respected is the Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penelitian Islam LPPI, Institute for Islamic Studies and Investigations , led by Amin Jamaluddin. In it turned to street politics and joined the FPI in a physical attack on an Ahmadiyah compound in Parung, Bogor, where the Qadian Ahmadiyah was then having its annual national meeting.
PII networks are still strong, allegedly also in the armed forces and the bureaucracy.
It was ideologically close to Masyumi but formally independent and therefore did not suffer when Masyumi was banned. Not all members of the organization accepted his ideas, however; others tended towards more conservative or Islamist viewpoints. Numerous HMI members made successful careers in the bureaucracy, in education, in business, or in politics. After the elections, about half of all delegates, nicely distributed over all parties, were former HMI members.
Diponegoro in Jakarta Karim From the s on, PMII branches flourished at general universities as well. The most important of the campus-based student movements was the Tarbiyah movement. Inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Tarbiyah movement, which emerged in the course of the s, organized religious discussion and mental training sessions.
The political party PK S was established by former Tarbiyah activists. Remaja Masjid and Pemuda Masjid were teenage and youth groups active in major non-university mosques. Numerous later radicals as well as moderates share a history of activism in this network in the s or s.
Dakwah predication organizations The most prominent of all Indonesian dakwah organizations, to which numerous later movements and institutions are endebted, is the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia DDII or Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication, which was established by Mohamad Natsir and other former Masyumi leaders in The DDII kept the Masyumi network alive through various media ventures and had an ambitious programme of training preachers.
Unlike most Central and East Javanese pesantren, these had remained loyal to Masyumi after the conflict that caused NU to leave the party. Al-Hafidy and at least one of his co-workers had prior Darul Islam connections in Aceh, and in Jakarta they appear to have been connected to the underground NII.
Al-Hafidy was arrested in the wake of the Tanjung Priok riots of and attracted wide attention nationally and internationally due to his fearless and outspoken criticism of New Order policies during his defence in the courtroom.
Like the latter, it provided preachers in the provinces with standardized sermons. The Muhammadiyah considers itself as an organization for dakwah; but within the Muhammadiyah there is a special organization for predication, the Majelis Tabligh Council for Dissemination , which is considered as the most conservative body within the Muhammadiyah organization. This used to be one of the most conservative bodies within the NU, and the one that has had the most direct connections with Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World League.
Nurcholish Madjid was hailed as the innovative thinker, who distanced himself from stagnant Islamic politics of the Old Order period and looked forward instead, preaching a message of tolerance and pluralism. Dawam Rahardjo was the organizer, active in a series of NGOs; and several friends provided support in the background. Together they were referred to as the Islamic Renewal pembaruan Islam or pembaruan pemikiran Islam movement.
Fifteen years later , after Nurcholish Madjid had returned from Ph. In the s, Paramadina expanded its activities beyond the monthly seminar-style public lectures and debates in posh surroundings to include various courses and publications, in which the focus was increasingly on pluralism and respect for other religious traditions.
Most non-fundamentalist Muslim intellectuals of the period were at one time or another associated with LSAF. Some of its staff later joined Paramadina. In , Soeharto suddenly allowed the establishment of a formal association of Muslim intellectuals, to be headed by his trusted minister 02 CDII. Analysts differed on whether ICMI represented a strengthening of Muslim civil society and a genuine intellectual forum or was a ploy of Soeharto to co-opt some of his former critics at a moment when he was facing challenges from the armed forces.
As a counter move he established the Forum Demokrasi, in which he cooperated with mostly Christian intellectuals of various backgrounds. ICMI survived into the post-Soeharto period but has become insignificant. In the post-Soeharto years, Paramadina retained a highly visible presence, contributing to debates on the re-interpretation of received Islamic teachings. The most remarkable newcomer on the scene, however, was Jaringan Islam Liberal JIL, Liberal Islam Network , which received appropriately liberal funding from The Asia Foundation until it ran into too much opposition from conservative Muslim circles.
JIL is in many respects the successor to the pembaruan Islam movement, but it lacks the protection that Nurcholish Madjid and his colleagues enjoyed from the New Order regime. LKiS has consistently positioned itself as more left-wing and committed to social and economic justice, whereas JIL embraced economic liberalism. Both institutes aim to keep the ideas of their founders alive and offer a protective umbrella to younger activists.
Only a small proportion of these NGOs has an explicitly Islamic identity or character. Unlike LP3ES, LSP had a single leader, Adi Sasono, who had a strong Masyumi background and appeared to represent more left-leaning views of development and more explicit criticism of the role of the military.
Towards the middle of the decade, Sasono and Rahardjo teamed up with Abdurrahman Wahid, scion of the most prominent NU family, for a programme of community development projects to be carried out in and around pesantren, the traditional Islamic boarding schools. The three men were to play parts in numerous later NGO ventures. Because neither Sasono nor Rahardjo, with their urban Masyumi backgrounds, had easy access in the pesantren world, they needed the cooperation of Abdurrahman Wahid, and through the latter recruited a number of other young men of NU background, who were trained in the management of development programmes.
These men there were no women activists among them as yet later laid the foundations of NGO activism in NU circles. The director was, and remains until today, Masdar F. Other sponsors proposed different programmes, and P3M, like many other NGOs, has always had to find a balance between its own ideals and the changing global NGO agenda as mediated by such sponsors as the Ford Foundation.
In the early s, activists who had previously worked with P3M established a separate NGO exclusively focusing on gender-related issues, named Rahima. Just like P3M, Rahima has both Masyumi- and NU-affiliated activists; however, it focuses less specifically on the pesantren world. Several other NGOs that were closer to the pesantren world followed suit: At the NU Congress, Abdurrahman Wahid was chosen to lead the organization, and a number of other men with experience in NGO work also took up leading positions.
To this end, the NU established its own NGO, called Lakpesdam Institute for Research and Development of Human Resources , that was to carry out a wide range of developmental and educational activities in segments of society where NU was strongly represented. Lakpesdam was based in the capital and active nationally; at the provincial level, similar NGOs with similar programmes were established. Quite a few active Fatayat members were previously or concurrently involved in Rahima, Lakpesdam or other NGOs; Fatayat provided one of the main channels through which Muslim feminist ideas reached the grassroots.
First we should know whats the meaning of drugs addiction? Drug addiction is a complex brain disease. It is characterized by compulsive, at times uncontrollable, drug craving, seeking, and use that persist even in the face of extremely negative consequences.
Drug seeking becomes compulsive, in large part as a result of the effects of prolonged drug use on brain functioning and, thus, on behavior. For many people, drug addiction becomes chronic, with relapses possible even after long periods of abstinence. The Definition confirm us how serious the consequences of using Drugs.
According to a report based on an illicit drug and injection safety study of 20 Asian countries conducted by the Center for Harm Reduction in Australias Burnet Institute, drug injecting is spreading to all the countries [of Asia] and its popularity is increasing. How Dangerous the drugs abuse for us. Its a threat that could kill an entire generation.
One generation of this nation will be lost if we do not take action together and immediately. In short, we must be ready to go to war against illicit drugs and the war must start from home. Prevention is better than cure. We have so many example around us, what happened to the users. Some bcome crazy, Some was going to the jail, And The others were died.