Starts with the FHA failure condition severity classification. • ARP A provides a development assurance level assignment process. – Function Development. ARP, Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) ARPA is a guideline from SAE Complying with DOC and DO using Model-Based Design ( PDF). SAE Aerospace Electronics and Avionics Systems Conference. SAE ARP has been widely applied in the process of airworthiness certification in highly-integrated or complex electronic system of civil aircraft since Li conducted the comparison of the DAL assignment methods between ARP and ARPA. Research on failure simulation.
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This document discusses the development of aircraft systems taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and functions. ARPA substanfally revises the industry guidance for the development of aircraft and provided key contribufons to ARPA, ARP , and ARP NASA/CR– Application of SAE ARPA to Flight. Critical Systems. Eric M. Peterson. Electron International II, Inc., Phoenix.
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Contents 1 Objectives of the document 2 History 3 References 4 See also 5 External links Objectives of the document ARP addresses primarily Avionics and especially Avionics software, in the context of an ever increasing integration of the aircraft control systems.
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Singgih Satrio Wibowo. Popular in Systems Theory. Alimah Azeli. In order to better understand and apply ARP A in the field of airworthiness and safety, this paper will compare SAE ARP A and on aspects of applicable scope, development process and integral process, etc, expecting to make clear the differences and carry on analysis about the differences to show the significances of the changes for civil aircraft airworthiness and safety. Introduction The transport airplane airworthiness standards such as FAR, JAR, and CCAR make a mandatory requirement to the public airplane basic safety, hence, the FAA requests SAE to define the appropriate nature and scope of system-level information for demonstrating regulatory compliance for highly integrated or complex avionic systems.
So it plays a major role in ensuring and improving civil aircraft airworthiness and greatly promotes the development level of civil aircraft.
But when following the SAE ARP , some problem arises, such as there is no datail guidance to assign development assurance level. So there is a need for a methodology to assign development assurance level in the development process. The new version provides guidelines for civil aircraft and system development, and provides a detailed method to ensure the right allocation of development assurance level.
Scope and nature SAE ARP is applicable to: Highly-integrated system: refers to perform or contribute to multiple aircraft-level functions Complex system: refers to systems whose safety cannot be shown solely by test SAE ARP A is applicable to: z Aircraft z Systems that implement aircraft functions ARP has been prepared primarily for electronic systems which, by their nature, may be complex and are readily adaptable to high levels of integration.
However, the guidance is also applicable to engine systems and related equipment. Introducing modifications and upgrades after the system is operational is an expensive exercise. Existing Regulatory Framework for Safety, Security Assessment and Certification The existing framework for the certification of airborne systems comprises of regulations and industry standards.
The regulations prescribe the minimum certification requirements of airborne systems, while industry standards offer methods of compliance which are generally accepted by regulatory authorities.
The requirement for system certification hardware and software is only for airborne systems. The safety assessment process provided by SAE ARP includes methodologies to evaluate aircraft functions and the design of systems performing these functions to ensure hazards associated with each function have been properly addressed .
The identified failure conditions associated with aircraft functions and combinations of aircraft functions are classified based on the failure condition severity i. The system assurance level to be defined at development stage is governed by this classification. These are taken into consideration in establishing safety related design requirements of system hardware and software.
Common Cause Analysis CCA supports the development of system architecture that affects specific and related systems that have sensitivity to common cause events. The airworthiness security process prescribed in RTCA DO includes a plan for security certification, security scope definition, security risk assessment and subsequent decision whether the risk is acceptable or not.
For unacceptable risks security development and securi- ty assurance activities are initiated. Similar to the iden- tification of failure conditions in the safety assessment process, threat conditions are identified and related impacts on safety are analysed, upon which severity is classified based on the effect i. All of the standards mentioned above are for airborne systems, with the security standard mainly focusing on aircraft approved to carry more than 19 passengers.
Furthermore DO standards states that it does not address the security of ground systems including those that provide services for communication, navigation, surveillance and air traffic services.
The ground systems are connected to the aircraft, not physically, but electronically through the signal in space. The existing framework for safety, security assessment and certification does not address this. The security assessment process which starts with the security scope definition and identification of threat conditions that are probable attack scenarios which could lead to failure conditions.
These failure conditions may be caused by or contributed to by the loss of the security attributes of the assets including confidentiality, availability and integrity. The failure conditions that may occur due to a security threat condition are then assessed as part 17th Australian Aerospace Congress, February , Melbourne the safety assessment process for classification of the failure safety effects and safety risks. Here the security assessment process integrates with the safety assessment process.
This method is also useful to find the system vulnerabilities that could be exploited for an attack.
The methods for improving the safety of the systems would include, fail safe protection methods, system cautions and warnings before failure and safety related maintenance tasks to be performed during operation. The methods for improving the security of the systems would include deterrent, preventive, detective, corrective and recovery measures. The requirements are identified based on the level of risk. The parameters, failures and the severity of the failure condition, govern the measurement of safety risk while threats, vulnerabilities and consequences govern the measurement of security risk  as given in Eqn 1 and 2.
The safety and security requirements are to be verified and validated during the system development life cycle, then implemented and certified. The safety and security assessment models published as industry standards, which are currently used during system certification process are only applicable for airborne systems.