PDF | On Jan 1, , Timothy Lim and others published In book: Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues. Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals,” Comparative Political Studies (); ( with Though scholars of comparative politics have produced a vast amount of. Define key terms covered in the chapter, such as politics, power, the state, nation, science, hypothesis, and. (dependent and independent) variables. ▫ Discuss.
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This article discusses several crucial questions that comparative political scientists address. These questions also form part of the basis of the current volume. Comparative Politics: Approach and. Concepts. I. What is Comparative Politics? II . Elements of the Political System. A. Governmental Institutions. B. Political. PDF Drive is your search engine for PDF files. As of today we have theories and issues involved in the study of comparative politics. Focusing on KEN.
It also refers to the belief that neoliberal institutions esp. Both men shaped Western history of the time in profound ways. Napoleon became famous for expanding t the French empire throughout Europe Lyons Achieving such a society would require promoting equality of opportunity and giving the most help to those who were the most disadvantaged Trudeau, Pierre Elliott Trudeau had a vision for canada in the s.
Read More The Dichotomist Views on Action in Wollstonecraft and Lao-Tzu Lao-Tzu, from his work Thoughts from the Tao-te Ching, offers political protocols for the leader through the abandonment of action and guidelines on how people should live their lives. Read More This essay will discuss the concept of politics as power. This essay draws upon Andrew Haywoods four categories of concepts, those being politics as the art of government, politics as public affairs, politics as compromise and consensus and politics as power.
Prior to describing the concept of politics as power Read More Thoreau Quote Analysis Thoreau was trying to suggest that people are obedient to unjust governments because they lose sight of their morals and are led by sins.
In the following sentence Thoreau wrote, After the first blush of sin, comes its indifference and from immoral it becomes, as it were, unmoral, This book shows how the TRC truth and reconciliation commission s restricted mandate has affected what TRC is, how it is heard, who speaks, how they speak and who Read More Compare and contract by how one right-wing and one left-wing single party leader consolidated power.
One left-wing single party leader was Stalin, while Hitler is a right-wing single party leader. Both are known through history for doing quite terrible things to their own people and other people.
Read More Compare the reforms carried out by the Late Qing government and the Nanjing government in terms of their impact on the development of China's modernization. The reforms of the Late Qing government and the Nanjing government had their own impacts on the development of China's modernization.
Read More The Letters Patent declared the Crown-appointed Governor to be the head of the government and ordered the formation of the Executive and Legislative Councils to assist in administration.
The Hong Kong governor was largely controlled by the British government during the early 20th century according to legislative and executive powers, Read More Discussion Communism in the Soviet Union only brought more oppression and brutality through the emergence of civil wars and lack of freedom incorporated by the government.
The three-year war only ended up worsening the economy as there was no peasant production and crops plummeted as many people starved. Democratic Rule The function of government is used all over the world in several different forms.
Many countries use a governmental system in order to keep their country from becoming corrupt. Read More While democracy is present in much of the modern world, it is difficult to define exactly what democracy is due to the varying ways of governing present in the world.
Some types of government systems include absolute control and democratic rule. In this paper, I will compare England and Germany according to Lijpharts models of majoritarian and consensus democracies. To the South, slavery was such an intrinsic institution in their Read More This essay seeks to explain why the British Constitution, unlike those of other countries such as the USA, Germany and many other countries, is so difficult to define.
To define the constitution is taken to mean knowing the supreme rules that regulate the actions of various governing bodies and their Read More Elite theory states that an elite, ruling class controls the power in society through their accumulation of wealth and knowledge. Dryzek and Dunleavy This is used to control the masses who are easily duped with a desire to be ruled.
Read More Abstract Consensus is the belief in abandoning all values, principles and policies. There is a commonly held belief that it doesn't matter who thepresident of the United States is because they hold very little actualpower.
It is a general sentiment about not only the President, butpoliticians in general. Many hold the belief that all politicians arebeholden to special Read More In many different ancient cultures, religion held a significant importance. The gods were given sacrifices, great temples, and fantastic mythological stories were told in the Middle East, China, and all along the Mediterranean. In Rome too, religion held a particular importance for both the plebeians and the patricians, who both Read More Both readings from this week, Dreams from my Father and Rules for Radicals, are concerned with the organizer as an individual.
What does the daily life of an organizer look like? Numerous Fascist leaders of the far-right wing and Communists of the far-left were able to take advantage of Read More How did the rise of nationalism, formation of nation-states and movements of political reform affect the world during this period of time? The unification of Italy and Germany began because nationalism was starting to be used by conservatives to win support for the existing social order.
Read More The government plays a very big role in the United States, it makes sure we the people are all behaving and doing things in a certain manner. Our government has set itself up into a mixed economy where we have different sectors like public, government, and private.
Read More The Communist Manifesto and the Industrial Workers In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels lay out a plan that looks to benefit the industrial workers and put an end to the unequal social conditions and working conditions that those workers experience.
These very struggles can be seen through the words of Bhutan, a country in South Asia that recently transitioned from being an absolute monarchy to a constitutional Articles and reports on. Demonstrated ability to formulate responses to questions in novel and relevant ways. May also display some faults, such as missing certain aspects of the question, containing patches of weaker material, or failing to articulate the writer's own views.
Demonstrates good knowledge of primary material and firm grasp of critical debates and concepts, which are deployed as part of a broader argument. Evidence of potential to proceed to further postgraduate research.
Shows some capacity for independent and critical analysis, but may be poor in terms of individual research. Relevant but limited reading and use of examples and evidence. Lacks evidence of ability to proceed to further postgraduate research. Presentation satisfactory: possible problems with e. Little or no ability to structure thoughts coherently. Little or no evidence of capacity for independent and critical analysis.
Creative writing for tv and new media sp Creative writing professional organizations Our Australian subject-oriented and professional academic writers are adept at writing programming language projects according to the Australian university guidelines.
Have a look at the fields which our computer programming assignment help experts from Australia cover: If you are struggling with any programming homework, then our programming experts are there to assist you. By taking our help with programming assignments, you can be assured of scoring topmost grades. If your schedule has you taking four or five upper-level political science classes in the same semester, be prepared for a lot of reading or try to arrange your schedule differently.
Before you can take a level seminar, you must first take a methods course and another course within the same subfield as the seminar. Ideally, you would have taken the introductory course in the subfield as well as one or two others related to the topic of the seminar. Internships do not count as seminars. Before you start an honors thesis, if you choose that option, you must first take a methods class and you must have had a few classes relevant to the area that you want to research.
You may not start an honors thesis on a topic in which you have little background. In recent years almost all scholars have de-emphasized the role of economic factors, existing social grievances, or political ideologies in igniting violent conflicts, to stress instead the context of economic and political opportunities in which potential rebels may decide to engage in violent action.
Collier and Hoeffler link the emergence of rebellious activities to the availability of both finance—namely, abundant natural resources—and potential recruits—individuals with reduced prospects of material advancement through peaceful activities.
In the volume we edited, Kalyvas insists as well that war-driven conditions are themselves likely to shape the outcomes of interest: Much changes as civil wars unfold, p. The exploration of political conflict has also generated an important literature on contentious politics episodic public collective action and social movements sustained challenge to holders of power.
Modernization and the spread of democracy spawned the invention of social movements. Yet at the same time, the time and location of social movements that is, their interaction with political institutions, society, and cultural practices determined the form in which they emerged Tarrow and Tilly ; Lichbach and deVries Modern democracies are representative democracies.
As such they are also party democracies: Political representatives generally coordinate in stable organizations for the purposes of contesting elections and governing. In a chapter reproduced in this volume, Herbert Kitschelt offers of a broad review of the questions that scholars ask about party systems and the way they answer them. Why do democracies feature parties in the first place, as almost all do?
Why do many parties compete in some democracies whereas in others competition is restricted to two major parties or two major ones and a minor one? Why do some parties compete with the currency of programs, others with valence issues, and still others with clientelism and patronage? Why are elections perennially close in some systems, lopsided in others? Kitschelt reviews the measures that scholars find helpful in answering these questions—party-system fractionalization, the effective number of parties, electoral volatility, and cleavages.
The problems afflicting party politics are regionally specific: Whereas scholars of advanced industrial systems worry, as Kitschelt notes, about the decay of party—voter linkages, scholars of new democracies worry about whether such linkages will ever take shape.
As shown in Boix , the nature of parties and party systems can be traced to the underlying structures of preferences, which could be either uni- or multidimensional. But these preferences or political dimensions were mobilized as a function of several additional key factors: These electoral institutions, as shown in Boix , were themselves the product of strategic action by parties. In a way, that chapter may be read as a response to two types of dominant approaches in the discipline: By contrast, we think it should be possible to build historical accounts in which we reveal 1 how political actors make strategic choices according to a general set of assumptions about their beliefs and interests and 2 how their choices in turn shape the choice set of future political actors.
One of the central contentions of the comparative work done in the s was that partisan attachments and party systems had remained frozen since the advent of democracy in the West.
Yet in the last forty years party—voter linkages have substantially thawed Wren and McElwain Economic growth, the decline of class differences, and the emergence of postmaterialist values lie in part behind this transformation. In the wake of changes in the electorate and its preferences, it took party bureaucracies some time to adjust.
Taking advantage of the slow rate of adjustment of the older parties, new parties sprang up to lure away dissatisfied voters. Yet party dealignment and electoral volatility have not diminished, even after new parties that should have stabilized the electoral market have entered these party systems. Therefore, to explain continued volatility, we must look beyond changes in the structure of voter preferences.
Weakening party—voter ties must be put in the context of a shift in the educational level of the population and new technologies radios and TV. As parties became less important as informational shortcuts, politics has grown more candidate centered and party elites have been able to pursue electoral campaigns without relying on the old party machinery.
In the last two decades, democracy has become the dominant system of government across the world, both as a normative ideal and as a fact. But not all nominal democracies generate accountable, clean governments. In a chapter reproduced in this volume, Susan Stokes addresses one of the possible causes of malfunctioning democracies by looking at the practices, causes, and consequences of clientelism.
Shaped by a sociological approach, researchers at that time explained clientelism as a practice underpinned by a set p. Yet, as Stokes claims, clientelism must rather be seen as a game in which patrons and clients behave strategically and in which they understand that, given certain external conditions such as a certain level of development and the organizational conditions that allow for the effective monitoring of the other side , they are better off sustaining a pattern of exchange over the long run.
Such a theoretical account then allows us to make predictions, which are beginning to be tested empirically, about the institutions underpinning clientelistic practices, the electoral strategies pursued by patrons, and the potential economic and political effects of clientelism: Political activism has also spawned a large body of research. In her chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics , Pippa Norris reviews the social and psychological model of participation developed by Verba and Nie, as well as the critiques generated from a rational choice perspective.
She then examines how key developments in the research community and the political world have affected the ways in which we evaluate this subfield. She notes a growing interest in the role of institutions in shaping participation in general and turnout in particular.
Echoing Wren and McElwain, she draws our attention to changes in party membership, which was widespread and hence instrumental in many advanced democracies but has progressively shrunk, with consequences that are still widely debated among scholars.
The constructs of trust and social capital, pioneered by Coleman and Putnam, are also relevant to our expectations about levels of participation. All of these, she notes, have expanded and in a way marginalized the more institutionalized, party- and union-based mechanisms of participation that dominated in the past.
In the magisterial five-volume Handbook of Political Science published thirty years ago by Greenstein and Polsby, the term accountability appears not once. The term representation appears sporadically and, outside of the volume on political theory, only a handful of times. Thirty years later, accountability has emerged as an organizing concept in comparative politics, with representation not far behind. If everyone in a society had the same preferences, the problem would not be a problem at all.
But never is this the case. And scholarship on preference aggregation must come to grips with social choice theory, which should lead us to doubt that citizens in any setting in which politics is multidimensional can p.
The dominant strains of research, some of which come to grips with the social choice challenge and others of which ignore it, include examinations of the congruence between preferences and outcomes of various sorts Powell Another sort of congruence study examines the coherence of issue positions among co-partisans, both political elites and citizens who identify with parties, and tends to find a good deal more coherence among the former than among the latter.
Yet another deals with the congruence between electoral platforms and campaign promises, and government policy. Neoinstitutional scholars have focused their attention on electoral rules, executives, legislatures, federalism and, more recently, the judiciary.
The existing work on executives and legislatures has centered on two broad topics. First, what is the effect of a constitutional structure based on the separation of powers? Second, what determines the patterns of coalition-making in governments?
In the volume we edited, Samuels reviews what we know about the impact of the separation of powers on accountability. The conventional view in the United States is that a separation of powers is so central to democratic accountability that this separation is nearly definitional of democracy.
Samuels evaluates this proposition empirically. His own research and that of other authors which he reviews address questions of accountability and representation, as well as the effects of a separation of powers on the policy process and on regime stability. Among his central findings is that presidentialism has several deleterious effects; a separation of executive from legislative powers increases the chances for policy deadlock and for the breakdown of democracy.
In turn, Strom and Nyblade critically assess the literature on coalition-making, particularly regarding the formation of governments in parliamentary democracies.
Although influential theoretically, this approach proved to be rather unsatisfactory empirically. As discussed by Pablo Beramendi in a thought-provoking chapter, we know far less than we should about federalism. Our theories on the origins of federalism are still sketchy—security threats, the level of heterogeneity, and the evolution of the world economy in terms of its level of integration shape the extent of decentralization in a critical manner.
The study of the consequences of federalism is slightly more advanced. The relationship between democracy and federalism seems to be conditional, as far as we know, on the particular internal structure of federalism.
The effects on the economy of having a federal structure, in turn, depend on how the federal institutions allocate power and responsibilities between the center and regional governments. The study of the judiciary was traditionally reserved to legal scholars.
Assessing judicial independence, as these authors acknowledge, is not always straightforward. They advocate two measures: The authors note that a drawback of either approach is that courts, which seek among other objectives not to have their decisions reversed, may rule against governments only when they anticipate not being reversed, in which case these measures would tend to overestimate their independence.
Hence, whereas rulings against governments probably indicate independence, rulings in their favor are less certain indications of dependence see Helmke ; It was in the s, that is, about two decades after comparative politics started to develop causal, testable theories, that political scientists ventured in a systematic way p. Part of that growing interest in political economics started with the analysis by political sociologists of voting and, particularly, of economic voting. The first models presented a simple rule of thumb that voters could—and did—apply when deciding whether to vote for incumbents: Factors that Duch suggests will influence economic voting include party-system size, the size of government, coalition governments, trade openness, and the relative strength of governing and opposition parties in the legislature.
At the same time that a few scholars studied how voters react to economic conditions, other researchers began exploring how politicians affect the economy and therefore voting decisions. After Nordhaus published a seminal paper in on electoral business cycles, the scholarly literature has evolved in three complementary directions.
A first set of studies has examined the impact of electoral cycles on the economy. Scholars now tend to agree that the presence of politically induced economic cycles is rather irregular. But, of course, this opens up an important question particularly from the point of view of democratic representation: Why should voters accept policy manipulation and leave governments unpunished?
In our volume, James Alt and Shanna Rose argue that political business cycles must be understood as a particular instance of the broader phenomenon of political accountability in democratic regimes.
Political business cycles are not merely the result of a signaling game in which politicians try to build their reputation as competent policy-makers. A second set of studies has focused on the effect that parties, mostly as congealed preferences, may have on macroeconomic policies.
Here scholars detect some, generally mild and mostly transitory, effect on macroeconomic factors: Left-wing governments tend to get lower unemployment than right-wing governments for a while, at the cost of permanently higher and even accelerating inflation Alesina et al.
Yet these effects are mostly conditional on the institutional setup of central banks and wage bargaining institutions in which governments operate: This last insight has generated the third set of works in the political economics literature Hall and Franzese ; Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange After the first papers and books on the topic were written within the framework of modernization theory, welfare state scholars moved to assess the impact of power politics through parties and unions on the construction of different types of welfare states.
That class-based orientation, however, had limited validity beyond some archetypical cases with high levels of union mobilization and strong left-wing parties. In doing so, they have shifted our attention from the pure redistributive components of the welfare state, which were the keystone of pure class-based, power politics accounts, to social policies as insurance tools that address the problem of risk and volatility in the economy. Related to this change in perspective, welfare state scholars have progressively spent more time mulling over the impact of the international economy on social policy.
Two path-breaking pieces by Cameron and Katzenstein showing economic openness and the welfare state to be positively correlated have been followed by an exciting scholarly debate that has alternatively related the result to a governmental response to higher risk due to more economic volatility in open economies , denied the correlation completely, or called for models that take openness and social policy as jointly determined.
As Carnes and Mares discuss in the essay we edited, the welfare state literature has indeed traveled a long way from its inception. Yet it still has a very exciting research agenda ahead of it: First, it should become truly global and extend the insights and problems of a field built around Europe and North America to the whole world; second, it should offer analytical models that combine the different parameters of the successive generations of research in the area; third, it should take seriously the preferences and beliefs of voters across the world and the cultural differences we observe about the proper role of the state ; and, finally, it ought to integrate the consequences of welfare states something about which we know much less than we should with the forces that erect them.
Whether the transition to democracy in many developing countries in recent decades has meant a shift to accountable, effective government is a question that has concerned many scholars of comparative politics.
Although both the number of researchers and the theories on the topic have multiplied considerably, we still know little about the relationship between growth and political regimes. We know that policy and performance vary considerably across democracies. Poor democracies show lower growth rates and worse public policies than rich democracies.
In a nutshell, in spite of having formal mechanisms that should have increased political accountability and the welfare of the population in poor democracies, the provision of public goods and economic performance remain thoroughly deficient in those countries.
In our edited volume, Keefer claims that, since the key parameters of democracy and redistribution inequality and the struggle for political control between elites and nonelites cannot explain that outcome since low development and democratization are cast as contradictory , it must be political market imperfections that explain the failure of governments to deliver in democracies.
In young, poor democracies, politicians lack the credibility to run campaigns that promise the delivery of universal benefits and public goods. Accordingly, they shift to building personal networks and delivering particular goods. This type of electoral connection, compounded by low levels of information among voters, who can scarcely monitor politicians, results in extreme levels of corruption and bad governance. Economic voting would enforce accountability. Whereas prime ministers are more likely to be turned out by voters when economic times are bad, they are more likely to be turned out by their colleagues when economic times are good.
If as economic voting implies officeholders who produce bad economic outcomes will face the wrath of voters, why would they ever risk a costly transition to a liberalized economy? Reviewing the literature on economic transitions in Eastern Europe, Timothy Frye identifies a number of factors, from the quality of domestic governance to membership in the European Union, that make governments more likely to undertake reforms and then stick with them Frye Yet serious gaps remain in our understanding of the determinants of market reforms, including what role is played by institutional legacies from the past, and by contemporary social institutions—networks, business associations, reputational mechanisms—state institutions—courts, bureaucracies, legislatures—and the interaction of the two.
The questions posed above and others that our contributors raise are too complex, and too important, to restrict ourselves to one or another methodology in our attempts to answer them. But the contributors to the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics explain the advantages and pitfalls of a wide range of techniques deployed by compara-tists, from econometric analysis of cross-national data-sets and observational data to extended stints of fieldwork.
They employ a variegated tool kit to make sense of political processes and outcomes. John Gerring contends that neither case studies nor large- n comparisons are an unalloyed good; rather, both entail tradeoffs, and we are therefore well advised as a discipline to retain both approaches in our collective repertoire.
Where case studies are good for building theory and developing insights, Gerring argues, large- n research is good for confirming or refuting theory. Where case studies offer internal validity, large- n studies offer external validity. Where case studies allow scholars to explore causal mechanisms, large- n comparisons allow them to identify causal effects. Interacting personally with subjects in their own setting may be the only way to get a handle on many crucial research questions, such as which of many potential political identities subjects embrace and what their self-defined interests are.
Fieldwork is not without perils, Wood explains, both intellectual and personal. Interview subjects may be evasive and even strategically dissimulating; field researchers may have strong personal reactions, positive or negative, to their subjects, reactions that may then color their conclusions; and fieldwork is a lonely endeavor, with predictable highs and lows.
Wood suggests strategies for dealing with these pitfalls. James Mahoney and Celso Villegas discuss another variant of qualitative research: The aims of this research differ from those of cross-national studies, they contend. Comparative political scientists, like empirically oriented sociologists and economists, are bedeviled by four problems: Yet as Franzese argues, these obstacles, which are in fact inherent to our trade, should not lead us to dodge quantitative strategies of research.
On the contrary, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the plausible loss of precision involved in measuring large numbers of observations does not justify retreating to qualitative studies of a few cases—even if we attain very precise knowledge about small samples, they fail to yield robust inferences.
Similarly, the presence of multiple and conditional causality cannot be solved easily by case studies although good process tracing may alleviate these problems. Finally, qualitative case-study research does not necessarily escape p. To move from correlational analysis to causal propositions, Franzese contends, we need to employ more sophisticated techniques, such as variable instrumentation, matching, or vector autoregression.
But even these techniques are not sufficient. Here we would like to add that, influenced by a few macroeconomists and political economists, part of the discipline seems on the verge of uncritically embracing the use of instrumentation to deflect all the critiques that are leveraged against any work on the grounds that the latter suffer from endogeneity.
It turns out that there are very few, if any, instruments that are truly exogenous—basically, geography. Their use has extraordinary theoretical implications that researchers have either hardly thought about for example, that weather determines regime, in a sort of Montesquieuian manner or simply dodge when they posit that the instrument is simply a statistical artefact with no theoretical value on its own and then insist that it is the right one to substitute for the variable of interest.
Thus, we want to stress with Franzese that only theory-building can truly help us in reducing the problem of endogenous causation. Adam Przeworski offers a less optimistic perspective on observational research, large- n or otherwise.
Because these covariates are unobserved, we cannot test the proposition that they, rather than the treatment or putative cause, are actually responsible for the effect. Przeworski discusses traditional as well as more novel approaches to dealing with endogeneity, but his chapter leans toward pessimism. But perhaps the mood of the chapter is more pessimistic than it need be.
Theory should help us distinguish cases in which endogeneity is plausibly present from ones in which it is not. This task is implied by a hypothetical example that Przeworski offers.
A researcher wishes to assess the impact of governing regime on economic growth. Future leaders of some countries study at universities where they become pro-democratic and learn how to manage economies, whereas others study at universities that make them prodictatorial and teach them nothing about economic management. Both kinds return home to become leaders and govern their societies and economies in the manner consistent with their training.
It therefore appears that democracy produces economic growth. But there is a difference between unobserved and unobserv able.
It is not obvious to us why this variable could never be systematically observed, should p. Indeed, the use of game-theoretical models, of varying degrees of formalization, is a strong recent trend in comparative politics. Illustrating his methodological claims with his recent research on the politics of coffee production and commercialization, Bates offers a comprehensive strategy for comparative study.
The first step of research is apprehension: Verstehen is then followed by explanation: The structure of the game allows us to push from the particular to the construction of broader theories, themselves susceptible of validation.
The construction of theoretical explanations must then be subject to the test of confirmation: This implies progressively moving from small- n comparisons to much larger data-sets in which researchers can evaluate their theories against a broad set of alternatives and controls.
An analysis of the methodological foundations of contemporary political research would be incomplete without an exploration of the role of rationalist assumptions in the discipline.
Ostrom assesses the first generation of studies of collective action, which stress the structural conditions number of players, type of benefits, heterogeneity of players, the degree of communication among them, and the iteration of games that may increase the likelihood of achieving cooperation.
She finds these studies wanting. Ostrom recognizes that the rationalist model only explains part of human behavior. Hence she calls for a shift toward a theory of boundedly rational, norm-based human behavior. Instead of positing a rationalistic individual, we should consider agents who are inherently living in a situation of informational uncertainty and who structure their actions, adopt their norms of behavior, and acquire their knowledge from the social and institutional context in which they live.
They are capable of designing new tools—including institutions—that can change the structure of the worlds they face for good or evil purposes. They adopt both short-term and long-term perspectives dependent on the structure of p. To some extent, the discipline seems to come full circle with this contribution: This journey has not been useless. On the contrary, as we traveled from one point to the other we have learned that a good theory of politics must be based on solid microfoundations; that is, on a plausible characterization of the interests, beliefs, and actions of individuals.
When we pause to take stock of the evolution of empirical political science in the last three decades, we think we should be pleased with the progress we have made as a community of scholars. The discipline has moved forward substantially in modeling certain political outcomes. We can offer the first inklings of theories of state formation and democratization.
We are in a position to understand how power is sustained and exercised in dictatorships. We have fruitful models of the impact of institutions in preference aggregation and electoral behavior.